of the Applicant

Style of cause

 

MEMORANDUM OF FACT AND
LAW OF THE APPLICANT

 

PART I – OVERVIEW

 

1. This Application concerns the legal status of advisory opinions issued under section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26.

2. Under Canadian administrative law, a “federal board, commission or other tribunal” refers to a body established by or under federal legislation to make determinations, exercise statutory authority, or perform decision-making functions outside the ordinary superior court system. Such bodies are characterized by their statutory foundation, specialized mandate, and decision-making role, and are subject to judicial review by the Federal Court to ensure legality, jurisdictional compliance, and procedural fairness.

3. The term “federal board” is used here in its statutory sense and does not presuppose any particular theory of Canadian federalism.

4. Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act purports to authorize the Governor in Council to refer important questions of law or fact to the Supreme Court of Canada for an advisory opinion. Proceedings conducted under section 53 do not involve private litigants asserting rights in the ordinary adversarial judicial process, but instead arise from executive referral and result in advisory determinations.

5. The best-known example of such a proceeding is Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, initiated by Order in Council P.C. 1996-1497.

6. In that proceeding, the Court addressed questions concerning the legal consequences of a purported unilateral secession and stated that a clear majority vote on a clear question in a referendum would give rise to a constitutional obligation on other constitutional actors to negotiate.

7. References under section 53 are initiated exclusively by governments. Individuals whose legal and constitutional interests may be affected have no ability to commence such proceedings, and no direct procedural standing within them comparable to ordinary judicial litigation.

8. Prior to 1949, advisory opinions of the Supreme Court of Canada were in some instances subject to review by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. After the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council, such advisory opinions have been treated as effectively final within Canada.

9. In 1992, Parliament enacted what is now section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, conferring upon the Federal Court express jurisdiction to grant relief in judicial review against a “federal board, commission or other tribunal” in respect of jurisdictional error, illegality, or procedural unfairness.

10. This Application proceeds on the basis that a body exercising functions under section 53 of the Supreme Court Act constitutes a “federal board, commission or other tribunal” within the meaning of section 2 and section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, and that its exercise of advisory functions is therefore subject to judicial review.

11. The present Application does not merely allege error within a conceded statutory jurisdiction. It raises a prior and foundational question: whether the advisory function purportedly exercised under section 53 of the Supreme Court Act is constitutionally authorized under section 101 of the Constitution of 1867. The issue is therefore one of constitutional competence, not simply administrative legality.

12. The Application accordingly raises a foundational question concerning the legal character of the advisory jurisdiction and the availability of judicial review in respect of advisory opinions rendered pursuant to section 53.

Later you’ll add:

PART II – FACTS

PART III – ISSUES

The issues raised by this Application are:

(a) Does this Honourable Court possess jurisdiction under s. 18 of the Federal Courts Act and the Constitution Act, 1867 to review the constitutional validity of statutory advisory jurisdiction established by Parliament?

(b) Are ss. 53, 36, and 54 of the Supreme Court Act, and any analogous statutory provisions purporting to confer advisory jurisdiction, constitutionally valid?

(c) Can Parliament, pursuant to s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, create statutory advisory jurisdiction inconsistent with the constitutional structure of the judicature established by the Constitution Act, 1867?

(d) Do such statutory advisory provisions form part of an integrated statutory scheme that is constitutionally incompatible with the judicial power established by the Constitution Act, 1867?

(e) Is the Applicant entitled to declaratory and prerogative relief, including prohibition, in respect of such unconstitutional statutory advisory jurisdiction?
 

PART IV – LAW AND ARGUMENT

 

Standard of Review

This Application raises a pure question of constitutional validity concerning the jurisdictional limits imposed by s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the constitutional authority of Parliament to confer advisory jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court of Canada. Where the constitutional validity of a statutory scheme is challenged, no discretionary or deferential standard of review arises. The question is one of constitutional authority, to be determined by reference to the Constitution itself. Accordingly, the present Application does not engage the conventional standards of review applicable to administrative decision-makers, but instead requires the Court to determine the constitutional validity of the impugned statutory provisions as a matter of law.
 

//// Introductory paragraph (recommended): ///// contemporaneous recognition of the defect

– Fournier (introduce himin such a way as to bring in people like Mathen and institutions like Cambridge, publishing bullshit designed to destroy Canada ////
– refer to my affidavit re judges resisting the advisories
 
/// Introductory paragraph:

The constitutional defect in advisory jurisdiction was recognized at the time of its creation. Justice Minister Télésphore Fournier acknowledged during parliamentary debate that the advisory function could not be constitutionally secured absent amendment. This understanding was shared by members of the judiciary, who repeatedly expressed concern regarding the constitutional validity of advisory jurisdiction. These historical admissions are detailed in the Affidavit of Kathleen Pageot, affirmed [date], at paras. [X–X], and Exhibits [A–X].

Then continue with Section A. ///
 

A. Constitutional Supervisory Jurisdiction of the Federal Court

1. The superior courts continued under s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 possess a constitutionally entrenched core jurisdiction forming part of the judicial power of Canada. This core jurisdiction includes the supervisory authority to determine the constitutional validity of legislation and to review the legality, jurisdiction, and constitutional compliance of statutory bodies and their enabling statutes. This supervisory jurisdiction arises from the Constitution itself and cannot be removed, displaced, or immunized by ordinary legislation: Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s. 96; Crevier v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1981] 2 SCR 220 at 237–238; MacMillan-Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1995] 4 SCR 725 at paras. 15, 29–31.

2. As affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada, the superior courts possess a constitutionally protected “core jurisdiction” that is beyond the power of Parliament or the legislatures to abolish, transfer, or alter by ordinary statute: MacMillan-Bloedel, supra at paras. 15, 29–31. This principle reflects the constitutional structure of the judicature established in 1867, under which judicial power must remain vested in courts constituted in accordance with the Constitution and cannot be conferred upon statutory or executive bodies in a manner inconsistent with that structure: Hinds v. The Queen, [1977] 1 AC 195 (PC) at 225–228.

3. Pursuant to s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, Parliament validly established the Federal Court and conferred upon it jurisdiction to administer federal law. Parliament subsequently assigned to the Federal Court, through s. 18(1) of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, exclusive original jurisdiction to exercise judicial review over any federal board, commission, tribunal, or statutory authority. This statutory assignment constitutes a lawful allocation of forum within the constitutional judicial structure and does not abolish the underlying constitutional supervisory jurisdiction itself: MacMillan-Bloedel, supra at paras. 29–31; Crevier, supra at 237–238.

4. The Federal Court therefore possesses both the jurisdiction and the constitutional duty to determine the constitutional validity, scope, and legal effect of any statutory authority established by Parliament, including any statutory advisory jurisdiction purportedly exercised under federal law.

B. Constitutional Invalidity and Structural Incompatibility of Statutory Advisory Jurisdiction

5. The impugned statutory provisions, including but not limited to ss. 53, 36, and 54 of the Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, purport to establish advisory jurisdiction derived solely from ordinary legislation enacted pursuant to s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Such statutory authority does not form part of the constitutionally entrenched judicial power established and protected by the Constitution.

6. Under the constitutional structure established in 1867, judicial power is vested in courts constituted in accordance with the Constitution and exercising jurisdiction according to law. Parliament cannot, through ordinary legislation, alter, supplement, or hybridize the constitutional judicature by conferring statutory authority inconsistent with its constitutional structure: Hinds, supra at 225–228; MacMillan-Bloedel, supra at paras. 15, 29–31.

7. Legislatures cannot immunize statutory powers from constitutional review, nor create statutory authority incompatible with the constitutional structure of the judicature: Crevier, supra at 237–238. Any statutory advisory jurisdiction established by Parliament remains constitutionally subordinate and subject to judicial review for constitutional validity.

C. Non-Severability of the Impugned Statutory Advisory Scheme

8. The statutory advisory provisions form part of an integrated statutory scheme that purports to confer advisory authority incompatible with the constitutional structure of the judicature established by the Constitution Act, 1867. This statutory advisory function is not constitutionally severable without fundamentally altering the institutional character and operation of the statutory court itself.

9. The impugned statutory scheme purports to authorize the exercise of hybrid functions derived solely from statute and unknown to the constitutional judicature established in 1867. This structural incompatibility renders the statutory advisory scheme constitutionally invalid insofar as it purports to authorize or incorporate such advisory jurisdiction.

10. Any acts or purported acts undertaken pursuant to such unconstitutional statutory advisory provisions are invalid and without constitutional force or effect.

 

A. Advisory Opinions Are Not Exercises of Judicial Power Properly Understood

(1) Judicial power consists in adjudicating legal rights arising from facts

1. The judicial power, as contemplated by the Constitution Act, 1867, consists in the adjudication of legal rights and obligations arising from concrete facts properly brought before a court of competent jurisdiction.

2. Courts do not exercise legislative or advisory functions. Their constitutional role is to apply the law to facts and determine the legal consequences that follow.

3. As explained by Stephen A. Scott in Note on the Nature of Legal Interest in Constitutional Litigation, constitutional validity is not itself a freestanding object of adjudication, but a legal condition recognized in the course of determining legal rights:

4. “The question whether or not the contents of that enactment form part of the corpus of the law… is purely and simply a question of law.”

5. Judicial recognition of constitutional validity or invalidity is therefore incidental to adjudication. Courts do not invalidate legislation in the legislative sense, but simply refuse to recognize unconstitutional enactments as part of the law when applying law to facts:

6. “A pronouncement of invalidity is not a direct but a collateral attack upon the enactment… the judge… merely refuses to recognise it as part of the law.”

7. This principle reflects the fundamental distinction between legislative and judicial power. Courts do not make or repeal law; they recognize its existence or absence in the course of adjudication.

 

(2) Judicial determinations do not create constitutional law, but recognize it

8. Constitutional validity exists independently of judicial declaration. Courts do not create constitutional norms but recognize them when adjudicating legal rights.

9. As Scott explains, constitutional nullity exists independently of judicial proceedings:

10. “Nullity… is in principle applicable proprio motu by the Court, without plea or argument.”

11. Judicial determinations of constitutional validity do not bind the world in the manner of legislative enactments, but operate through the doctrine of precedent:

12. “Res judicata applies to determinations of rights, not to determinations of rules of law.”

13. Courts therefore do not exercise legislative authority when recognizing constitutional limits. Their authority lies in adjudication, not law-making.

 
h6

(3) Advisory proceedings do not involve adjudication of legal rights

14. Advisory proceedings differ fundamentally from adjudicative proceedings.

15. In adjudication, courts resolve legal disputes between parties whose legal rights are directly affected by the outcome.

16. By contrast, advisory proceedings involve abstract questions posed in the absence of adjudicative facts and without determination of legal rights.

17. As Scott explains, no person has a legal interest in the law itself, but only in legal rights arising from facts:
     

    “No one… can have an interest in a point of law as such, but only in legal rights which… arise under the law.”

18. Advisory proceedings, by definition, do not adjudicate legal rights arising from facts. They therefore do not constitute exercises of judicial power in the adjudicative sense contemplated by the Constitution.

(4) Advisory opinions do not possess the constitutional character of judicial determinations

19. Because advisory proceedings do not adjudicate legal rights, they do not produce judgments in the ordinary constitutional sense.

20. Their conclusions do not operate as determinations of rights binding through res judicata.

21. Nor do they exercise judicial power in the constitutional sense contemplated by section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which authorizes the establishment of courts, not advisory bodies.

22. The judicial power consists in adjudication. Advisory proceedings are consultative in character.

 

(5) The constitutional role of courts is limited to adjudication

23. The constitutional structure established by the Constitution Act, 1867 assigns legislative power to legislatures and judicial power to courts.

24. Courts exercise judicial power by adjudicating legal rights.

25. Advisory proceedings do not involve adjudication of legal rights and therefore fall outside the core exercise of judicial power properly understood.

 

B. The Advisory Jurisdiction Conferred by Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act Is Not Authorized by Section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867

(1) Section 101 authorizes the establishment of courts, not advisory bodies

Section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides:

“The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act, from Time to Time provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada…”

Section 101 authorizes Parliament to establish courts exercising judicial power. It does not authorize Parliament to create bodies exercising non-judicial or advisory functions.

The constitutional meaning of a “court” is defined by its function: the adjudication of legal rights and obligations arising from facts properly brought before it.

As established above, judicial power consists in adjudication. Courts do not issue abstract opinions but determine legal consequences arising from facts.

The constitutional authority conferred by section 101 must therefore be understood as limited to the establishment of courts exercising judicial power in the adjudicative sense.

(2) Advisory jurisdiction is not an exercise of judicial power

Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act purports to authorize the Governor in Council to refer questions to the Supreme Court for hearing and determination.

Such questions may be referred in the absence of adjudicative facts, legal disputes, or determination of legal rights.

The function exercised under section 53 is consultative in nature. It does not involve the adjudication of legal rights between parties.

Advisory proceedings do not involve the exercise of judicial power in the constitutional sense.

The judicial function consists in applying law to facts and determining legal consequences. Advisory proceedings determine no legal consequences arising from adjudicated facts.

(3) Parliament cannot confer non-judicial functions under section 101

Parliament’s authority under section 101 is limited to establishing courts exercising judicial power.

Parliament cannot expand the constitutional meaning of judicial power by statute.

The constitutional limits of section 101 cannot be enlarged through ordinary legislation.

Where a statute purports to confer functions falling outside the constitutional scope of judicial power, those provisions exceed Parliament’s authority under section 101.

(4) Advisory jurisdiction alters the constitutional character of the court

A court established under section 101 derives its constitutional legitimacy from the exercise of judicial power.

The exercise of advisory jurisdiction alters the constitutional character of the court by assigning functions not inherent in judicial power.

Advisory functions are consultative rather than adjudicative.

The Constitution Act, 1867 does not authorize Parliament to assign consultative constitutional functions to courts established under section 101.

(5) The advisory jurisdiction conferred by section 53 is therefore ultra vires section 101

Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act purports to confer advisory jurisdiction on a court established under section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Advisory jurisdiction does not constitute judicial power in the constitutional sense.

Section 101 authorizes Parliament to establish courts exercising judicial power, not advisory bodies exercising consultative functions.

To the extent that section 53 purports to confer advisory jurisdiction, it exceeds Parliament’s authority under section 101.
 

C. The Advisory Jurisdiction Established by Section 53 Is Therefore Ultra Vires
(1) Parliament cannot confer jurisdiction beyond the limits of section 101

The authority of Parliament to establish courts under section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 is limited by the constitutional meaning of judicial power.

Parliament cannot, through ordinary legislation, enlarge the constitutional scope of judicial power beyond its inherent limits.

The Supreme Court of Canada derives its constitutional legitimacy from section 101 and from Parliament’s lawful exercise of authority under that provision.

The jurisdiction of the Court must therefore remain confined to the exercise of judicial power in the adjudicative sense contemplated by the Constitution.

(2) Advisory jurisdiction falls outside the scope of judicial power

Advisory proceedings conducted pursuant to section 53 of the Supreme Court Act do not involve the adjudication of legal rights arising from facts properly before the Court.

Such proceedings occur in the absence of adjudicative facts, legal disputes between parties, or determinations of legal rights and obligations.

The function exercised under section 53 is consultative in nature.

The exercise of consultative functions does not constitute the exercise of judicial power in the constitutional sense contemplated by section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

(3) Section 53 purports to confer jurisdiction not authorized by the Constitution

Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act purports to authorize the Governor in Council to refer questions to the Supreme Court for hearing and determination independently of adjudication.

This purported jurisdiction does not arise from the adjudication of legal rights, but from executive reference.

The Constitution Act, 1867 does not authorize Parliament to confer consultative constitutional functions on courts established under section 101.

Parliament cannot, through ordinary legislation, transform a court exercising judicial power into a consultative body exercising advisory functions.

(4) Jurisdiction conferred beyond constitutional authority is ultra vires

Where Parliament purports to confer jurisdiction beyond the limits authorized by the Constitution, such jurisdiction is ultra vires and of no constitutional force or effect.

The limits imposed by section 101 are constitutional limits which Parliament cannot alter through ordinary legislation.

Jurisdiction exercised beyond those limits lacks constitutional foundation.

(5) The advisory jurisdiction established by section 53 is therefore ultra vires

Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act purports to confer advisory jurisdiction falling outside the scope of judicial power authorized by section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

To the extent that section 53 purports to confer advisory jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Canada, it exceeds Parliament’s constitutional authority.

Accordingly, the advisory jurisdiction established by section 53 of the Supreme Court Act is ultra vires section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
 

D. Advisory Opinions Issued Pursuant to Section 53 Lack Constitutional Authority

(1) Judicial authority derives from the lawful exercise of jurisdiction

The constitutional authority of a court derives from the lawful exercise of jurisdiction conferred in accordance with the Constitution.

Jurisdiction exercised beyond constitutional limits lacks constitutional foundation.

Where jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to statutory provisions exceeding Parliament’s constitutional authority, the resulting determinations do not derive their authority from the Constitution.

The constitutional legitimacy of judicial determinations depends upon the lawful exercise of judicial power.
 

(2) Advisory opinions are issued outside the exercise of judicial power properly understood

Advisory opinions issued pursuant to section 53 of the Supreme Court Act do not arise from the adjudication of legal rights and obligations between parties.

Such opinions are rendered in response to questions referred by the executive branch and do not resolve legal disputes arising from adjudicated facts.

Advisory proceedings therefore do not involve the exercise of judicial power in the adjudicative sense contemplated by section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

As established above, judicial power consists in adjudication. Advisory opinions are consultative in character.
 

(3) Advisory opinions do not constitute judicial determinations in the constitutional sense

Judicial determinations in the constitutional sense arise from the adjudication of legal rights and obligations between parties properly before the court.

Advisory opinions determine no legal rights or obligations between parties.

They do not operate as judgments binding through the doctrine of res judicata.

Their conclusions do not derive their authority from the adjudicative exercise of judicial power.
 

(4) Advisory opinions derive their authority solely from statute, not from the Constitution

Advisory opinions issued pursuant to section 53 derive their existence from statutory authorization.

To the extent that section 53 exceeds Parliament’s authority under section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, advisory opinions issued pursuant to that provision lack constitutional foundation.

Jurisdiction exercised beyond constitutional limits cannot produce determinations possessing constitutional authority.
 

(5) Advisory opinions issued pursuant to section 53 therefore lack constitutional authority

Advisory opinions issued pursuant to section 53 of the Supreme Court Act are rendered pursuant to a statutory provision exceeding Parliament’s constitutional authority under section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Such opinions do not arise from the lawful exercise of judicial power in the constitutional sense.

Accordingly, advisory opinions issued pursuant to section 53 of the Supreme Court Act lack constitutional authority as exercises of judicial power contemplated by section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
 

E. Relief Required
(1) The Federal Court has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief respecting constitutional limits on federal statutory authority

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 18 and section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act to grant relief in respect of federal statutory authority exercised or purportedly exercised beyond constitutional limits.

This Court also possesses jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief respecting the constitutional validity and legal effect of federal legislation and federal statutory powers.

Declaratory relief is the appropriate remedy where constitutional limits on statutory jurisdiction require judicial clarification.

The purpose of declaratory relief is to state authoritatively the legal limits imposed by the Constitution on the exercise of public power.

(2) Jurisdiction exercised beyond constitutional limits is of no force or effect

The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada.

Any exercise of jurisdiction beyond constitutional authority is without constitutional foundation.

Statutory provisions purporting to confer jurisdiction beyond constitutional limits cannot authorize the lawful exercise of judicial power.

Jurisdiction exercised pursuant to such provisions does not derive constitutional authority.

(3) Declaratory relief is necessary to affirm the constitutional limits of section 101

As established above, section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 authorizes Parliament to establish courts exercising judicial power.

Advisory jurisdiction conferred by section 53 of the Supreme Court Act falls outside the scope of judicial power authorized by section 101.

Declaratory relief is necessary to affirm the constitutional limits imposed by section 101 and to clarify the legal status of advisory jurisdiction purportedly exercised pursuant to section 53.

(4) Declaratory relief is necessary to clarify the constitutional status of advisory opinions

Advisory opinions issued pursuant to section 53 of the Supreme Court Act are rendered pursuant to statutory authority exceeding Parliament’s constitutional authority under section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Declaratory relief is necessary to clarify that such advisory opinions do not derive constitutional authority as exercises of judicial power contemplated by section 101.

Declaratory relief will provide legal certainty respecting the constitutional limits governing the exercise of judicial power in Canada.

(5) The Applicant therefore seeks declaratory and supervisory relief

The Applicant respectfully requests that this Court grant declaratory relief affirming the constitutional limits imposed by section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Such relief is necessary to ensure that statutory jurisdiction is exercised within constitutional limits.

Declaratory relief is the appropriate and proportionate remedy in the circumstances.
 

D. The advisory opinions issued under the unconstitutional statutory scheme have produced continuing legal effects

– Alberta trying to secede designing question based on Clarity Act which was designed to embody the secession opinion;
– Canadian Party of Quebec, a spinoff of xxxxx, calling to break up Canada and dismantle Quebec while citing the Secession opinion in their party constitution; as a party they in fact represent all the key principles of CRITIQ, a major pro-breakup movement centred on the Mount Royal Riding and tied to Alberta via Barbara Kay on one hand (linked to JCCP and also linked to the Trudeau regime still on life support in CITE LIBRE Information; there’s another female out west also on the CRITIQ board.. helps to prove the country is under active attack from movements east and west invoking the Clarity act and the 1998 secession opinion, even to the point of demanding that the opinion be viewed as “binding”, thus letting slip that they know it isn’t; and then a huge network of fake “unity” movements working to dismantle Canada, not least of which is the Special Committe on Canadian Unity with its court files in Montreal in tandem with Bertrand in Quebec City; and we have Bertrand’s admission witnessed by a judge that his real goal is the EU system for Canada, not Quebec independence;
 
CASE STUDIES
(1) Patriation Reference (1981)

(2) Secession Reference (1998)
 
– “Alleged silence of the Constitution” point directly to the foundational prnciple of Permanency in the working of the Union; point to the true principles of Confederation introduced by Maconald, Cartier et als in the 1865 Debates in Hansard and the purpose of these principles; point to the contradiction on 10 October 1964 when EII claims to personify the “democratic” state, giving “secession” referendums primacy while dispensing with monarchical indivisible unity;
– Churchill 1922 and Canada never asked for right to secede; how do I work that in?
– point to the Clarity Act as not a law of parliament, and contrary to the Constitution; and whose effects destroy the Parliament;
– point to the “unwritten principles” which are in fact the Badinter Standards/Copenhagen Criterias used to attach the dismantled remains of Yugoslavia to the European Union; in comparison, the goal is to attach the dismantled remains of Canada to the new Canadian Union and the new North American Union;
– Robert Lloyd Howse; Howse’s advisers in the article smuggling in the Badinter standards;
– William A Schabas; 25 years at SCC, he pretends s. 53 Board ignored the Yugoslav situation, studiously ignoring the Badinter Standards in the “unwritten prnciples” of the S. 53 Board;
– Constitutional “crises” purportedly to secure the “signature” of Quebec on the 1982 constitution were in fact attempts from the time of Bourassa onward, to import international state recognition standards including “distinct society”, etc., et., to purport to constitutionalize the dismantling of Canada in order to exploit the international community to destroy the country;
– We have to look at Bourassa, Meech Lake, Charlottetown Accord; and show all of them as attempts to import state recognition criteria into the constitution to facilitate not Canadian unity, but dismemberment by the international community;
– Look into Jeremy Webber as well, 1997, may have been a deliberate effort to give the secession reference an underpinning (in collaboration with Howse);
– Remember the Ontario courts in Lalonde v. Ontario used to confer the rubber stamp of a court of records on the “unwritten principles” as though they had been declaratory, rather than advisory only and wrong as well.
– Chretien, Senate Resolution, Quebec a distinct society
– Harper, Quebecois “nation”
– Snippet of old videos pestering to recognize Quebec as a people (linked with Power Corportation’s control of the 1995 No committee; power corp and pearson with Trudeau, Marchand, Sauve et als created the PQ to run the referendums.
= re the North American Union, track it from the PQ’s 1978 white paper Option Europe, into Canadian – Union (I have something by Levesque on that reported by a journalist); tracked into the FINA 2003 where – Bernard Landry and Marois co-host preparations for the North American Union;
– 1964 The Queen’s Speech pushing for breakup, substituting “democracy” for indivisible unity.
– who’s that author on Yugoslavia who outline several criteria for state recognition; find again and quote him;
 

(3) Nadon Reference (2014)

[Legal Consequences — placeholder]

//////////// This section does not introduce a new argument. It applies your existing argument to concrete instances.

It answers:

What unconstitutional effects flowed from the invalid scheme? /////////

h6> E. Legal consequences of unconstitutional advisory opinions

/////////// This ties directly into your ORDER SOUGHT. //////////////////
&nbdp;

E. Legal Consequences

 

PART V – ORDER SOUGHT

A. Relief Sought

 
The Applicant respectfully seeks the following relief:
 
(a) A declaration that sections 53, 36, and 54 of the Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, and any analogous statutory provisions purporting to confer advisory jurisdiction, are beyond the authority conferred upon Parliament by section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and are therefore ultra vires Parliament and of no constitutional force or effect;
 
(b) A declaration that such statutory advisory provisions form part of an integrated statutory scheme that is constitutionally incompatible with the judicial structure established by the Constitution Act, 1867 and is not constitutionally severable;
 
(c) A declaration that any acts or purported acts undertaken pursuant to such unconstitutional statutory advisory jurisdiction are invalid and without legal force or effect;
 
(d) An order in the nature of prohibition permanently prohibiting any further exercise of such unconstitutional statutory advisory jurisdiction;
 
(e) Such further and other declaratory, prerogative, or consequential relief as this Honourable Court deems just.

///// The principle of the Rule of Law requires that all exercises of public power derive their authority from law and remain within the limits imposed by the Constitution. The Constitution Act, 1867 defines those limits. The authority of any statutory jurisdiction must therefore depend upon its conformity with the constitutional framework established by that Act.////
 

Proposed Memorandum Footnote (Privy Council authority)

Footnote [X]
This principle was recognized from the outset of Confederation. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council repeatedly held that legislative authority in Canada derives exclusively from the British North America Act, 1867, and that enactments exceeding the authority thereby conferred are ultra vires and void. In Hodge v. The Queen (1883), 9 App Cas 117 (PC), the Privy Council affirmed that colonial legislatures possess only the authority granted by the imperial statute constituting them. In Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion (Local Prohibition Case) [1896] AC 348 (PC), the Privy Council held that the validity of legislation depends entirely upon conformity with the powers allocated by the British North America Act, 1867. Similarly, in Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario (Labour Conventions Case) [1937] AC 326 (PC), the Privy Council reaffirmed that legislative authority in Canada is limited by the Constitution and that legislation enacted beyond those limits is invalid. These authorities confirm that constitutional supremacy arises inherently from the Constitution Act, 1867 itself, and that legislation exceeding the authority thereby conferred is without legal effect.

16 February 2026 deM7 6h19 pm